Corruption Risk Assessment for Suriname

Final Report

February 2017
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Acknowledgments

This Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA) report was prepared for the Government of Suriname and the UNDP country office Suriname with an aim to perform a comprehensive corruption risk assessment and to make recommendations on measures for integrity/corruption risks mitigation which will be used to feed into the specific context of REDD+ in Suriname. The report is an initiative to address a growing concern about the corruption risks in Suriname.

The report calls for the institutionalization of all issues in relation to integrity and governance and all the major proposals by the various actors including for REDD+ strategy. The report will provide data and information about the corruption risks perceived in Suriname. The report also provides suitable actor focused mitigation measures to address perceived corruption risks.

Lastly, the report would not have been possible without the contributions of the stakeholders in Suriname.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>The Ministry of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATI</td>
<td>Accountability, Transparency and Integrity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Corruption Risk</td>
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<td>CRA</td>
<td>Corruption Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication Technology</td>
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<td>INTOSAI</td>
<td>International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMOS</td>
<td>National Institute for Environment and Development in Suriname</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROGB</td>
<td>Ministry of Physical Planning, Land and Forest Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Ministry of Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBB</td>
<td>Foundation for Forest Management and Production Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCA</td>
<td>United Nations Convention against Corruption</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Executive Summary

Corruption is facilitated by poor legislation, inadequate institutional mechanisms, inefficient public expenditure management, limited transparency, conflicts of interest, and the abuse of influence and power. Given the substantial revenues to be gained from its oil reserves and extractive industries, Suriname faces major challenges from corrupt practices. Government activities that are particularly vulnerable to the risk of corruption are:

- Public procurement.
- Revenue collection.
- Government appointments.
- Extractive industries.
- Local government.

The common features identified in institutions, sectors, and agencies as abetting corruption are:

- A concentration of powers and weak or non-existent checks and balances.
- Poor transparency surrounding executive decisions, combined with restricted access to information.
- Unclear regulatory systems that allow for discretionary decision making.
- Weak systems of oversight and enforcement.
- Inconsistency in applying procedures and processes.

This corruption risk assessment study presents a national inventory of perceived vulnerabilities. It evaluates existing corruption risks at the national and sectoral levels, with a focus on mining and forestry, providing a clear picture for the REDD+ program. Suriname faces several challenges related to good governance, including the prevalence of patron-client networks, its rich natural resource endowment, and a vulnerability to drug trafficking.1 Patron-client networks play the most significant role in Suriname’s misuse of authority, corruption risk, political economy, and governance.

In Suriname, corruption is a systemic problem that is embedded in almost all structures, institutions, sectors, and transactions conducted among business organizations both domestic and foreign, as well as among citizens and the government. This CRA report offers key findings on corruption risks, relevant actors, and actor-specific recommendations to the UNDP on implementing anti-corruption initiatives, in particular in the mining and forestry sectors and in relation to REDD+.

The report recommends: (a) strategies that the UNDP can target at particularly corruption-prone sectors and ministries, as well as at the national implementation of REDD+; (b) actors that are affected by, ready, and willing to combat corruption; and (c) approaches to address corruption risks effectively. Based on information gathered from various sources, strategic options were analyzed in relation to current political will, institutional structures, and institutional capacity.

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In view of the above, a corruption risk assessment (CRA) was conducted to address potentially vulnerable sectors, including mining, forestry, civil society organizations, and all parties charged with checks and balances. In the course of this CRA, the study found the following strengths and weaknesses.

1. **Analysis of Strengths**

The study discussed various aspects of corruption risk with stakeholders such as public officials, private-sector influencers, and ordinary citizens who are interested in understanding the country’s corruption situation. It found the following strengths:

1. Stakeholders acknowledge that measures should be taken to fill gaps in vulnerable sectors, especially in institutions engaged in public service delivery and policy implementation.
2. Some officials and authority figures are seriously seeking reform.
3. Respondents agree on the inadequacy of current anti-corruption legislation, institutional mechanisms, capacity, and community participation, and desire to assume responsibility for intervention activities.
4. The motivation to enact legislation to address corruption risks is high.
5. Citizens recognize the potential risks to the environment, mining, and forest sectors due to poorly defined checks and balances.
6. Requests for checks and balances from departments in public institutions are accepted as valid, as is the lack of resources and capacity to mitigate corruption risks.
7. Civil society organizations and NGOs already engage in anti-corruption efforts, particularly in raising awareness of corruption’s dangers and consequences, though with limited capacity and roles.

2. **Analysis of Weaknesses**

The following are some of the weaknesses that perpetuate corruption at various levels:

1. The existing laws are too old and narrow to address modern corruption risks.
2. Even the anti-corruption laws proposed do not cover many issues that affect sectors like mining and forestry, such as widespread deforestation.
3. Anti-corruption measures in Suriname are new, relatively narrow, and involve many tasks, thus requiring the provision of legislation, as well as human and financial resources.
4. Corruption is enabled by the failure to ratify legislation, poor checks and balances, and a lack of other necessary institutional structures.
5. Civil society has a limited role in promoting ethical principles like the rule of law, integrity, transparency, and accountability.
6. Suriname does not have a law that guarantees the right to access information.

Some of the gaps identified include:

**A Large Implementation Gap:** There are major gaps in legislation, mechanisms, transparency, and effort. Since Suriname continues to operate with inadequate institutional structures, mechanisms, and processes, which enable and sustain corruption, legislative reform is necessary.
Weak Enforcement: Suriname is weak in critical enforcement areas such as regulation, political governance, and citizen access to information.

Limited Participation of Civil Society: Because access to information is limited, civil society does not advocate for transparency and other anti-corruption measures. There are also few mechanisms to enforce processes that allow civil society, including citizens and vulnerable indigenous communities, to participate in development planning and policy making.

In light of the above strengths and weaknesses, actor-specific recommendations are provided below:

1. It is challenging to find the political will to address corruption in the government and at a national level. Generally, there is significant denial that the problem is as extensive as surveys and reports indicate it to be.
2. There is also a high tolerance for corruption. People are so convinced that it is an inevitable part of everyday life that they do not see a way out of the problem.
3. Although laws, institutions, and procedures are on the books, challenges exist in their implementation. Some legislation is as old as Dutch colonial standards.
4. Amidst this confusion, development agencies like the UNDP are still motivated to collaborate with other stakeholders to pressure the government for reforms that are hoped to make an incremental impact sector by sector.

Many actors are involved in corruption risk management, such as the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Finance, the Supreme Audit Institution, etc. Hence, the actor-specific recommendations call for:

1. A comprehensive program against corruption, which may be led by change agents within particular institutions or ministries who might be willing to pursue reform agendas, albeit at a sectoral level.
2. Proposed options that tend to focus on controlling administrative-level malpractice in the near or mid to long term, rather than on grand corruption problems.
3. Recommendations that tend to emphasize policy prescriptions that can be accomplished at the sectoral level, where the study found more motivation and will among stakeholders and civil society. In other words, such recommendations may lead to visible interventions.
4. Programmatic options that prioritize strategies that can be implemented by civil society, the private sector, or the media, and that can generate significant external demands on the government for reform in areas like transparency, accountability, and public participation.
5. Options for initiatives in non-designated areas, while the UNDP is in a better position to pursue those areas that are within its core mandate and competencies—in particular, working with civil society and capacity building at the national, institutional, and local levels.
6. Actions that seek success during various time frames and can demonstrate that corruption risk can be reduced, which will thereby sustain stakeholders in their activities.
1. INTRODUCTION

REDD+ is a “forest-based climate change mitigation approach under the UNFCCC” that aims to contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions through five activities: reducing deforestation; reducing forest degradation; conservation; sustainable management of forests; and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries\(^2\).

The link between corruption risks and deforestation and forest degradation has been recognised in Suriname in particular from REDD+ associated sectors. Corruption risk continues to threaten new climate initiatives like Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). In this respect, there are challenges in implementing REDD+ such as lack of technical and institutional capacities, challenges with regards to demarcation of the forest estate, political and policy contradictions between REDD+ goals and other development aims. If these issues are not adequately addressed, the risks of corruption from REDD+ are likely to be high in REDD+ associated sectors such as mining and forestry.

Hence, this assessment study examines the corruption risks in Suriname, the situation of governance in public institutions as well as REDD+ associated sectors, such as mining and forestry.

1.1 Definitions, and Typologies of Corruption

Definitions of corruption vary according to the approaches, aims and needs of policy makers. The legal approach, for example, requires accurate, explicit and definitive recognition of corrupt offences in order to construct legal frameworks that inform individuals, states and the international community of what constitutes prohibited acts. Socio-economic approaches tend to focus on the behaviour and economic interactions of the individual and their decision-making, while anthropological approaches are more analytical, nuanced and focused upon social systems\(^3\).

UNDP defines corruption as the ‘misuse of entrusted power for private gain’\(^4\). This recognises that corruption can take place in both the public and private sectors, and may involve corrupt interaction between the two. This definition is also sufficiently broad to include corruption within and by non-governmental actors. Corruption as commonly defined, including by UNDP and Transparency International is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.

Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. Definitions of corruption vary according to the approaches, aims and needs of policy-makers. Hence, corruption is defined how it is viewed.

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\(^2\) UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16 paragraph 70.
\(^3\) Concept Paper: Concepts, Tools and Areas for Action October, European Union 2011
The Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA) in Suriname uses corruption as an abuse of power or authority, beyond bribery and other forms of taking or giving undue advantage in connection to work or position in public sector institutions. The term ‘corruption,’ also includes breach of integrity, other unethical behaviour and other practices (e.g. conflict of interests).

The assessment identifies comprehensive actor-specific corruption risks and recommendations on measures on promoting integrity and mitigating corruption risks.
2. METHODOLOGY

This assessment was conducted by using a semi-structured questionnaire methodology for identifying and mitigating corruption risks. This chapter details the methodology of the assessment.

2.1 Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA) Objectives

The main purpose of this CRA was to identify the corruption risks in different decision-making stages of government, including the mining and forestry sector, and to rate the corruption risks based on time such as short-term, medium-term and long-term.

An actor-focused mitigation measure has been formulated based on the risks identified in the process of assessment, while the action plan will be developed once the mitigation measures are finalized.

The following are the main steps used to identify corruption risks in this assessment:

The CRA study applied the following methods of data collection and analysis:
1. Desk Study:
   - Review of national anti-corruption policies and strategies of the government of Suriname.
   - Study of anti-corruption related policies, strategies and studies.
     Collection and analysis of the laws and regulations related to corruption risks in the mining and forestry was conducted.
2. Key Interviews (KIs) with the authorities of constitutional bodies, government oversight agencies and parliament, government secretaries, government officials, development partners and CSO members were conducted.

Technique used for Data Collection

1. After determining categories of concerned stakeholders, interviewees were selected because they were relevant, reliable and authentic sources of information to meet the objectives of the study.

Tool used for KIs

A framework was developed during inception phase with in consultation with the UNDP Suriname to gather information from KIs. Respondent specific questionnaire / checklists were used to structure the interviews, and follow-up questions were asked to different categories of KIs. Respondents were briefly informed in advance about the purpose of the study.

2.2 Methodology for Identifying and Mitigating Corruption Risks

The objective of CRA was to provide an overview of corruption risks in general as well as from REDD+ perspective in Suriname. The aim of the study was also to identify common challenges, and to examine potential solutions to tackle these challenges. The methodology used to carry out CRA is to reflect the governance risks and opportunities that underpin the REDD+ processes in Suriname.
The CRA was based on consultation with the relevant stakeholders and actors. The CRA used stakeholders, who include representatives from government, academia, the judiciary, NGOs, the international organisations and the private sector, based on their vast and varied experience in the governance as well as the challenges of forest sector in the country.

Based on their knowledge and experience, the CRA first identified potential corruption risks linked to a number of governance and REDD+-related activities and thematic areas. It then assessed the likelihood that those risks would occur and the impact they may have were they to occur. The most severe risks (those with the greatest likelihood of occurring and the greatest potential impact) were then considered for follow-up action.

The objective of the assessment was to identify sources of corruption risks, areas of impact and meaningful events for the time bound anti-corruption measures. The assessment further assessed sectoral areas in detail such as mining and forestry as economically important sectors for Suriname. The collection of information focused on the following main areas:

1. The extent, scale, nature and impacts of corruption risks.
2. The most vulnerable areas for corruption and the origins of corruption risks.
3. The weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the anti-corruption mechanisms in place that have an impact, either direct or indirect.

Corruption risks were identified and mitigation measures were formulated based on the following steps:
1. Preparation of a corruption risk assessment plan and identification of stakeholders.
2. Collection of data.
3. Analysis of data.
4. Formulation of an actor-specific corruption risk mitigation measures.
5. Validation of the findings.

**Identify corruption risk:** Key stakeholders were asked to provide information to the decision-making process and the existing practices on risks management to identify potential corruption risks. These included each of the mining phases such as exploration, pre-operation, operation and post-operation, and deforestation and forest degradation in relation to the forestry sector. Based on information, the information was classified as short, medium and long term.

The CRA used a formula that measures the factors that provide opportunities for corruption to take place: 
\[ C = M + D - A, \]
where \( C \) is Corruption, \( M \) is Monopoly, \( D \) is Discretionary power, and \( A \) is Transparency/Accountability (Klitgaard, Robert. “International Cooperation Against Corruption.” Finance and Development March 1998). The formula suggests that reducing corruption risk is a function of reducing the misuse of monopoly powers, clarifying and limiting subjective discretionary powers within decision-making processes and increasing transparency and accountability.

### 3. OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION IN SURINAME
Suriname has undergone significant changes in the past few decades, especially since declaring independence. Despite being a democratic country, however, corruption risk often impedes good governance. The government has taken various steps to mitigate this problem, including developing an anticorruption law that has been pending approval in parliament for some years. Suriname has also signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC), although it has not ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Moreover, limited access to information prevents the media and civil society from playing a role in promoting integrity. Against this backdrop, corruption risk is still rampant and is an issue of particular concern in the context of the country’s growing extractives industry, prompting unnecessary deforestation and forest degradation. Corruption risk in the mechanisms operating within both the public and private sectors undermines citizens’ benefit from the extraction of natural resources, as well as the economic prosperity of the country as a whole. The complex and non-transparent corporate policies in extractive industries present additional corruption risks.

Some of the situational challenges are listed below.

1. The country faces challenges from persistent economic imbalances, even leading to downturns.
2. Suriname’s extractive industry dependent economic growth model puts enormous pressure on its ecosystems, causing the depletion and degradation of its pastures, forests, and water; habitat destruction; and a decline in biodiversity.
3. Suriname is disadvantaged by a politicized development approach to civil service, wherein elections result in vast changes of personnel, the erosion of capacity, and a lack of continuity in policy making. While legislation is in place for many critical policy areas, there is a gap in translating objectives into standards and procedures that would enable implementation and enforcement.
4. The trust of citizens in political institutions is declining, as evidenced by their tolerance for corruption.
5. Inadequate economic diversification, poverty in interior areas, vulnerability of rural livelihoods, exploitation of natural resources, and loss of income through environmental hazards are closely intertwined.

Suriname is currently discussing its anti-corruption legislation, with the goal of enacting a new law. However, it is uncertain how long this process will take, given its past inaction. Civil society and experts already maintain that the current draft is too weak on corruption risk, as it focuses mainly on whistleblower protection.

3.1 Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA) Findings

The CRA exercise discovered that Suriname has legal provisions against fraud and corruption dating back to Dutch colonial standards (penal code framework), with limited reforms to policies, laws, and regulations, including those on access to information. However, there are serious gaps in legal coverage and mandates, and, most importantly, in application and enforcement mechanisms.

Despite the government’s efforts, Suriname continues to suffer from rampant corruption. Indeed, it is cited as one of the major constraints for doing business (Ease of Doing Business, World Bank, 2014). The
country’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is not satisfactory. Such international assessments seem to indicate that the corruption risk in Suriname is increasing. Corruption allegations and scandals are common.

When asked about their experience of Suriname’s corruption risks, stakeholders stated that they are a very serious problem and there are deficiencies in terms of legislation, mechanisms, capacity, and in particular, the role of civil society and the media.

The CRA identified several weaknesses in current anti-corruption efforts, vulnerabilities to corruption risks, and measures for mitigating the risks identified. The analysis showed that the country’s most important strength was its acknowledgement that measures should be taken; technical experts within the government, civil society, and the private sector all believed that something needs to be done. It also found three vulnerabilities: a lack of citizen awareness, the inconsistent application of procedures, and the absence of whistleblower protections. These findings can be further classified into the following issues:

1. The environment of corruption could potentially undermine the performance, integrity, and effectiveness of national and sectoral institutions within the government.
2. An inadequate legal framework exists, including in sectoral legislation.
3. Institutions are inefficient, ineffective, and perceived as corrupt.
4. Distortions generated by such risks have contributed to growth and economic opportunities.
5. The chance to divert government revenues causes less money to be available to respond to perceived needs in society and to finance development activities.
6. Opportunities exist to render government regulations ineffective.
7. Wrongdoers can often operate with impunity.
8. Communities and citizens are unable to navigate the legal system transparently.

Identification and Assessment of Corruption Risks

The following steps were taken to determine the likelihood of various unethical situations.

**Corruption risk identification:** Stakeholders were asked various questions, according to their area of specialization, to identify the potential corruption risks in governance, industrial sectors, and various phases of natural resource extraction, such as licensing, exploration, pre-operation, operation, and post-operation.

The desk review for the CRA was also helpful in recognizing potential corruption risks in laws, regulations, and policies related to the extraction of natural resources, including REDD+-associated sectors.

**Corruption risk likelihood:** A simple qualitative scale was used to categorize the likelihood as high, moderate, or low.

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5 The CRA used a formula that measures the factors that provide opportunities for corruption: \( C = M+D-A \), or corruption = monopoly + discretionary power - transparency/accountability (Robert Klitgaard, “International Cooperation Against Corruption,” *Finance and Development*, March 1998). The formula suggests that reducing corruption risk is a function of reducing the misuse of monopolies, clarifying and limiting subjective discretionary powers within decision-making processes, and increasing transparency and accountability.
Based on CRA, the identified corruption risk summary is provided below:

**Table 1: Corruption Risks in Suriname**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corruption Risk Related To</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>L</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Framework and Governance</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 The absence of a national level anti-corruption strategy/legislation and action plan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Inefficient anti-corruption measures</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Inefficient existing anti-corruption legislation, the enforcement of legal provisions and mechanisms.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Public procurement transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Non-transparent organizational structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Inadequate application of the regulatory framework</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Limited meritocratic hiring rules, free access to public information laws, asset disclosure rules</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Inefficient law enforcement and prosecution.</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Unclear or inconsistent legislation regulating sectors like natural resources, environment.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Institution</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Insufficient management, financial management system, civil services, or decentralization of services delivery.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Inefficient oversight institutions or supervisory authorities</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Scope for discretionary decision making/ irregular internal procedures</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Scope for undue influences</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Possibility of conflict of interest</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Limited guidelines on usage of public resources</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Absence of disclosures</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Limited mechanism for information management system leading to leaks</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Manipulation of procurement documentation and offers</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Limited procedural system/mechanisms leading to misuse and misappropriation of funds</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Processes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Insufficient vigilance</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Irregular administration of contracts / inadequate supervision/ non - punishment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Voice and Accountability</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Tolerant attitudes of the society and acceptance of corruption as a part of life.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Low awareness.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Ignorance of the rules</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Disclosure of income, assets, and liabilities.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Access to information/reviewing access to confidential information.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rule of Law</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Deficiencies in regulatory framework such as granting exploration licenses, permits etc.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Rating is based on risk likelihood and its impact.
It is recognized that Suriname requires transparent and accountable policies and public institutions for its socio-economic development. Corruption risks are not all of the same type and are time bound. To reduce the potential for corrupt practices, it is necessary to embark on time-bound activities that strengthen ongoing anti-corruption initiatives. It is equally important to segregate risks according to their time frame. The assessment found the following time-bound corruption risks related to various actors:

### Table 2: Corruption Risks Based on Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corridor Risks</th>
<th>Immediate/ Short Term</th>
<th>Medium Term</th>
<th>Long Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risks related to awareness/education/ communication/ advocacy/capacity building, etc.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks related to institutional reforms/mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks related to legislation/procedures/institutional structures</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.2 Problem Analysis

The CRA reviewed studies and articles on corruption risks, the business environment, and anti-corruption measures in Suriname. Most of the information highlighted that the proliferation of laws and the lack of political will and commitment are the main causes of corruption. Overlapping functions and unclear jurisdiction, along with discretionary power and authority, presented opportunities for corruption in various sectors, particularly natural resources. Suriname does not practice a multiple-agency approach to fighting corruption or have sufficient regulations and mechanisms in place.
Corruption is generally seen as a pervasive and continuing problem at the political and institutional level.\(^7\) The current and previous governments both sent drafts of anti-corruption legislation to the National Assembly, although neither was passed into law (although it is currently under discussion again). There are concerns that anti-corruption measures in the penal code are not consistently enforced, and that the majority of those prosecuted to date have been civil servants.\(^8\) The sectors that are most vulnerable to corruption are government procurement, license issuance, land policy, customs, and taxation.

In 2014, Suriname, with a score of 36 (unchanged from the previous two years), was ranked 100 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report, it was listed as 162, representing a marginal increase over 2014. Suriname is recognized as the fourth most corrupt CARICOM nation, holding steady with a score of 36 for the third consecutive year.\(^9\) Suriname has signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, but not the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. Neither is the country a signatory to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery.

Corruption in Suriname is caused by insufficient preventive regulations and/or the ad-hoc concession of business licenses. Hence, it is perceived as common as a result of a manipulation of policies, institutions, and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers.\(^10\)

The Ministry of Justice and Police is in charge of combating corruption, but its efforts are limited by the lack of anti-corruption laws.\(^11\) The only existing legal framework comes from the penal code, but it is very outdated and new legislation is under discussion in the National Assembly. Similarly, the government does not require corporations to establish policies or internal controls, heightening the risk of foreign companies becoming involved in corrupt practices.\(^12\) There are also no financial disclosure laws for public officials.\(^13\) Corruption is perceived not only in the allocation of licenses, but also in the licensing process, the declaration of extraction results, and the payment of taxes and royalties, as no record of taxes or royalties paid can be found in the government’s books.\(^14\)

Bribery frequently occurs in Suriname's customs administration in relation to imports and exports.\(^15\) Moreover, businesspeople face a high corruption risk when bidding for public procurement. Public funds are often diverted, and officials may favour well-connected firms and individuals when deciding on policies and contracts.\(^16\) In addition, irregular payments in connection with awarding public contracts and licenses are widespread.\(^17\) As in other sectors, a lack of transparency makes the procurement system opaque.\(^18\) Companies operating in Suriname's natural resource sector also face a high risk of corruption.

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\(^7\) Stakeholder interviews and discussion.
\(^8\) Based on discussions.
\(^10\) Based on discussions.
\(^12\) Investment Climate Statements, 2016.
\(^16\) Global Competitiveness Report, 2015.
\(^17\) Ibid.
\(^18\) Investment Climate Statements, 2016.
Gold is the country’s main export, but gold mining lacks regulation, resulting in a substantial informal economy.\textsuperscript{19} It is estimated that illegal mining accounts for over two-thirds of gold extraction.\textsuperscript{20} Around 30,000-40,000 illegal gold miners are active in Suriname's interior, and this is seemingly tolerated by the government.\textsuperscript{21} The lack of regulation and a consequent lack of transparency facilitate corruption and serious environmental damage, which, in turn, threatens public health.\textsuperscript{22}

Complex laws, obscure mechanisms, non-transparency, and a lack of administrative capacity create an environment conducive to corruption. Dealing with permits and licences is cumbersome and time consuming and provides many opportunities for rent seeking. The literature on Suriname points to the corruption risks posed by the dominance of the nexus between corporations and authority holders. More specifically, it is argued that political interference undermines anti-corruption initiatives. The CRA findings show that corruption risks can have a systemic nature and that solutions must thus consider the cultural and political context of Suriname.

Table 3: Main Corruption Risks Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal actors</th>
<th>Risk area</th>
<th>Corruption risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Public actors** | Policy making, Regulation (licensing, permits, concession etc.), Planning and budgeting | • Discretionary rules and regulations.  
• Risks associated with weak institutional and legal setting, and reporting practices especially in sectors like mining, forest, environment etc.  
• Weak formulation of anti-corruption measures.  
• Weak institutional reform and mechanisms  
• Interpretation of law and regulations in favour of party of interest. |
| **Public and private actors** | Management, Procurement mechanisms, Checks and balances | • Discretionary management and administration.  
• Limited checks and balances.  
• Possibility of avoiding compliance with regulations.  
• Possibility of illegal logging, mining.  
• Discretionary policy environment in awarding contracts, permits, concessions, projects, etc. to friends and favourable people.  
• Chances of submission of false technical assessments such as baselines, socio-economic assessments, environment assessments, particularly in sectors like mining and forestry. |
| **Public actors and citizens and communities** | Land tenure, Services Benefits | • Weak laws requiring that foreign companies include a local element (community participation) in their operations.  
• Weak capacity to identify the issue of corruption as an area for social activism in Suriname.  
• Limited outcome-oriented networks of anti-corruption initiatives, organisations and structures in civil society with the same or similar focus areas to co-operate as far as possible and augment each one’s efforts, e.g. religious communities, academic/educational institutions, sports bodies, women’s organisations, developmental organisations, research organisations, consumer |

\textsuperscript{19} Vice, "Digging into Suriname’s Massive and Corrupt Gold Industry," January 2016.  
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
bodies, educational institutions and organisations, unions, employer organisations.

- Limited role in raising public awareness.
- Insufficient activities in training and education in anti-corruption programs, corruption risks, integrity etc.
- Limited capacity to develop and promote best practices.
- Civil society do not have a broader strategy against corruption risks and anti-corruption measures.
- Limited civil participation in decision-making.
- Limited visibility of civil society and recognition as an essential role-player in developing, implementing and sustaining an anti-corruption strategy/measures.
- Limited role to protect reporters, experts and victims as well as anticorruption activists through its advocacy or joint action with other local / international community.
- Limited initiatives for a strong coalition among different sectors of the society for fighting against corruption and safeguarding integrity.
- Insufficient space to play role model of integrity and good governance.
- Limited resources with civil society’s role in anti-corruption measures.
- Limited capacity and the necessary tools to foster the implementation of the international and UN Convention, protocols, and national measures.
- Limited capacity for understanding of corruption risks as a public sector specific problem.
- Limited national level structures (civil society).
- Poor access to information on sectoral policy and progress.
- Influence, abuse of discretion, clientelism/ favouritism, etc.
- Inefficient use of public funds.
- Omission of due conduct.
- Influence to receive local communities’ approvals to allow permits, concessions, licenses and contracts.
- Illegal logging leading to loss of income and livelihood to local communities, life threatening environmental damage, fraud, money laundering, extortion, threats of violence.
- Insufficient enforcement mechanisms and combating illegal logging and deforestation, laundering of forest products, fraud and illegal trade and smuggling in forest products.

Source: Based on CRA findings

3.3 Suriname and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

The EITI is a global Standard to promote the open and accountable management of natural resources such as minerals, oil, gas, and forests. In countries committed to the EITI, companies publish what they pay to the government and the government publishes its revenues from these companies for comparison and independent verification. The EITI helps prevent corruption by creating a healthy investment environment and encouraging public participation in decisions that affect people’s lives. The state can also use it as a tool to address any allegations of corruption.
The government of Suriname, from a policy perspective, has identified transparency, accountability, public participation, and effective representation as essential elements of good governance in extractive industries. To mitigate corruption and promote good practices, it is supporting its EITI candidature via a multi-stakeholder group composed of representatives from industry, government, and civil society. As a first step, the government aims to advocate for accepting the EITI standards and imposing greater transparency on the extractive industries, especially by raising collective awareness about the purpose and usefulness of the EITI.

In addition, the National Oil Company, Staatsolie Maatschappij Suriname N.V., is promoting transparency by actively participating in the government’s effort to become a member of the EITI. It is also calling for the transparent disclosure of revenues related to natural resource extraction and is involved in the fight against corruption in Suriname.

3.4 **Key Actors for Promoting Integrity and Mitigating Corruption Risks**

Corruption thrives when the government is not sufficiently accountable to its citizens or to the law. When independent oversight from parliament is not effective, politics are put above ethics and a lack of transparency results. While some laws and regulations exist on paper in Suriname that provide a framework for good governance, few control mechanisms operate in reality to ensure that this framework functions honestly, transparently, and in accordance with the public good. These dynamics are at work at both the elite and administrative levels.

Reducing corruption is ultimately a matter of political will. It will require a comprehensive approach that prioritizes transparency and citizen oversight of the government. This can be facilitated by building the capacity of civil society, in addition to public institutions, to educate citizens, advocate for reform, and monitor the government to encourage the responsible and accountable use of public resources.

Because of the relative institutional weakness of civil society and the inability of ordinary citizens to hold their government accountable, the risk of corruption exists in every nook and corner of Suriname. In this regard, the CRA has identified various actors that are vital in mitigating corruption risk. Some of the actors and strategies are briefly summarized below.

**Table 4: The Role of Key Actors for Promoting Integrity and Mitigating Corruption Risks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actor</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Developing legislation and strengthening integrity standards for elected and appointed officials at the national and local levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (at national level)</td>
<td>Drafting legal frameworks and capacities, enhancing the role of internal control and complaint bodies at ministries and public institutions, ensuring transparency in public procurement, and streamlining free access to information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources</td>
<td>Formulating the national policy and controlling the management of minerals, water, and energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Physical Planning, Land, and Forest</td>
<td>Governing land policy and land use planning, including the management of forests and protected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Regional Development</td>
<td>Coordinating development activities and local governance, representing the interests of indigenous and Maroon tribal communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Police</td>
<td>Combating the laundering of forest products and their illegal trade and smuggling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Management, Ministry of Physical Planning, Land, and Forest Management</td>
<td>Administering forest law and management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Maintaining transparency in revenue management and allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+/NIMOS</td>
<td>Addressing corruption risks through building capacities for REDD+ strategy, helping civil society organizations to promote REDD+ integrity, strengthening indigenous and interior communities, sharing data, and enhancing local governance; in the medium and long term, supporting legislation reforms such as land rights, grievance redress, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank of Suriname</td>
<td>Identifying, tracing, and suppressing money laundering and the financing of terrorism; preventing the informal economy; and enhancing financial investigations, especially in the mining and forestry sectors, including promoting stolen asset recovery initiatives and strengthening international cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Audit Institution</td>
<td>Reforming the legal framework and institutional capacities to comply with the standards of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and assisting in financial investigations such as forensic accounting, money laundering, and lifestyle audits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Prosecutor Council</td>
<td>Expediting prosecution through improved information sharing from interior regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Procurement</td>
<td>Providing transparent and accountable government procurement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Developing the capacity to control the laundering of forest products and prevent their illegal trade and smuggling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Department</td>
<td>Improving tax fraud investigations, with a focus on plantation and mill laundering, under- or over-reporting of volumes, over- or under-invoicing, and tax evasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Media</td>
<td>Promoting freedom of expression, of information, and of the press; publicizing the principles of integrity, transparency, and anti-corruption to the masses; and enhancing media campaigns through scientific articles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Private Sector</td>
<td>Encouraging sound business practice based on corporate governance, accountability, diligence, and compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Engaging in corruption risk awareness and mitigation, supporting integrity and transparency, encouraging accountability and protest against a corruption-tolerant culture, pressuring the government for anti-corruption legislation and compliance with anti-corruption conventions, promoting citizens’ active participation in anti-corruption activities, strengthening the role of civil society organizations in monitoring the public sector, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Analysis of Challenges and Threats

The main governance challenges in the context of corruption risk in Suriname, as identified in consultations with both the public and civil society, involve public-sector reform, the protection of the rights of the indigenous and Maroon populations, the improvement of electoral processes, the transparency of public management (anti-corruption), a better awareness of citizens’ rights (access to information), and mechanisms to encourage participation in anti-corruption activities by civil society and non-governmental organizations.

Other challenges include:
1. Fiscal insecurity, reduced state income, and impeded provision of public services at the national level.
2. A loss in economic growth.
3. Citizens’ mistrust in government, political leaders and parties, public institutions, and the rule of law.
4. A less attractive investment climate and hindered business development.
5. An increase in organized crime, money laundering, and terrorism-related activities.
6. A lack of transparency, rule of law, and governance that encourages corruption and impedes service delivery.
7. The weakening of corruption risk management and anti-corruption efforts.
8. Poor recovery of the proceeds of corruption.
9. The cynicism of citizens about the spread of corruption and the delays in fighting it and in holding its perpetrators accountable.
10. Low community awareness of corruption and its dangers. In particular, those in the grassroots interior lack the support, capacity, and skills to meaningfully engage with authorities and hold them responsible for poor service delivery and illegal activities in their area.

3.5.1 Deforestation and Forest Degradation

Rich natural resources, such as oil and minerals, and renewable resources, such as forests, should benefit the national economy of Suriname by generating foreign currency reserves, government revenues, and opportunities for industrialisation. Instead, the country is at an economic disadvantage, possibly because of its governance. Resources are diverted from the public, bringing wealth to a few rather than to the many. The main reasons for this are the perceived high levels of corruption within law enforcement and the public institutions responsible for managing these resources, such as mining and forestry. The forestry sector is especially vulnerable to corruption, since many forests are located in jurisdictions with weak governance and poor regulations; these regions often suffer from systemic attacks, especially in the mining sector.

1. The CRA revealed that Suriname has a limited legal framework, in terms of policies, laws, regulations, and programs, to address corruption risks, including in REDD+-associated sectors. In addition, it is difficult to enforce the existing policies and laws.
2. In the CRA process, stakeholders agreed that ensuring public participation is a major governance challenge and is particularly important in tackling corruption, including in REDD+ areas.
3. It was noted that, considering the limited level of community participation, corruption in implementing the REDD+ initiatives is highly likely. This lack of participation is itself symptomatic of the marginalisation of communities within natural resource governance.
4. Corruption risks included the manipulation of data to determine the baseline information for REDD+, such as historical land-use trends and drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.

5. The CRA exercise provided insight on the diverse issues, perceptions, and risks relating to corruption and REDD+. It is worthwhile to look more closely at some of the corruption risks that stakeholders identified as high priority, considering the gaps in policy and capacity, environmental and community impact, and scale. These include:
   - Risk originating from politicians influencing the issuance of permits and licenses to favour their friends or their own businesses.
   - Risk from allowing illegal permits, contracts, and plans.
   - Risk of misusing official resources.
   - Risk related to fraudulent reporting such as mining inventory, revenue, or taxes.
   - Overpricing.
   - Collusion in bidding.

**The Main Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Suriname**

There are many other reasons for deforestation and forest degradation. Some are presented below.

1. A World Bank country assessment on law compliance, prevention, and control of illegal activities in the forestry sector found that weak law enforcement is due to a combination of low capacity and insufficient political commitment, especially when there are vested interests.23 Many of these findings remain relevant today.

2. From 2000 to 2015, mining (73%), road infrastructure (15%), and urban development (4%) were the direct drivers of deforestation (in order of impact).24

3. Shifting cultivation and forestry are the two proximate drivers identified for forest degradation.

4. A number of institutional preconditions for improving law compliance are currently not in place.

5. The institutions responsible for forest law enforcement (the SBB and the police) have limited authority to act, especially in relation to monitoring, control, and supervision.

6. Various other activities may negatively affect forest health and composition, including fragmentation due to mining or to non-anthropogenic natural causes such as forest fires or storms.

7. Various forest management practices for timber harvesting have resulted in different degrees of forest degradation.

8. Another contributor is selective logging, where forest cover remains post-harvesting.

9. Road infrastructure and urban development directly eliminate forests; they are also highly relevant as underlying causes of increasing deforestation in other land-use sectors such as mining and agriculture.

10. Economic and technological factors such as poverty, lack of capacity, and production techniques play an important role in influencing current and future deforestation for smallholder land users.

11. Inadequate legal recognition for collective land rights is often seen as a barrier to sustainable land and forest management.

12. There are challenges to assisting communities to formulate their own development priorities and plans to address local issues like poverty, illiteracy, decision making, and economic opportunities.

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23 The World Bank Index ranks countries from 100 (perceived as very ethical) to 0 (perceived as very corrupt) and has placed Suriname 36/100 in 2014. This is consistent with the 2013 and 2012 scores of 36 and 37, respectively.

24 Background Study for Redd+ Implementation: Multi-Perspective Analysis of Drivers of Deforestation, Forest Degradation and Barriers to Redd+ Activities, 2016.
Ownership of land versus land rights is still an issue when providing concessions and logging permits.

In addition to the above, a number of other factors make the forestry sector in Suriname vulnerable.

1. Ambiguous forest laws and regulations that are complicated or contradictory facilitate bureaucratic corruption.
2. The lack of transparency in issuing licenses or permits to companies or individuals, or in the terms of these licenses or permits, seriously limits public accountability for forest management.
3. Unclear land tenure rights have meant that ownership of forested land is often subject to dispute, especially between the people of interior regions and the government, creating opportunities for the misuse of authority.
4. Overlapping roles in agencies such as mining and forest ministries lead to competition and confusion in the logging permit system.

The CRA found that the following actors are directly linked to the forestry sector and its illegal activities:

**Table 5: Institutions Associated (Directly or Indirectly) with Deforestation and Degradation in Suriname**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions/Mechanisms</th>
<th>Corruption Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized government institutions: Ministries</td>
<td>Ambiguous forest laws permits, licensing, concession, inventory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Limited capacity &amp; mechanisms for investigation &amp; to reach out to interior for security reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment agency</td>
<td>Business friendly environment reports for licensing or permits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
<td>Limited areas for prosecution for crimes in illegal logging/environmental compromises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Falsification of documents for exports to illegal cross border smuggling through ships or land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial institutions/informal money transfer agencies</td>
<td>Capital outflow, money laundering, informal economy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.5.2 REDD+ in Suriname

Suriname is a forest-rich country that historically had a low deforestation rate. However, in recent years, deforestation and forest degradation have increased dramatically through mining, and then infrastructure development, conversion to pastureland, and extractive industries, destructive logging, fires, etc.

Deforestation is the clearing, destroying, or removal of trees through deliberate, natural or accidental means. If deforestation risks are not addressed promptly, the loss of trees and other vegetation can cause
climate change, desertification, soil erosion, fewer crops, flooding, increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and a host of problems for people living there. Moreover, reducing emissions from the forestry sector has an important role to play in both mitigation and adaptation.

**Challenges**

Corruption is widespread in REDD+-associated sectors like mining and extractive industries, including the forestry industry, which often have particularly high levels of poor governance. Hence, it is not unreasonable to expect that corruption risk may affect REDD+ in Suriname.

The main challenges in implementing REDD+ include:

1. Potential conflicts between land-use policies and REDD+ strategies.
2. Gaps between transparency and mining/forest governance policies and a lack of understanding of REDD+ issues among stakeholders.
3. The negative impact of informal mining on development, leading to severe environmental damage, including mercury poisoning of populations adjacent to the informal mining settlements. The most significant source of risk to the environment is informal mining.\(^{25}\)
4. A lack of capacity among REDD+-related decision makers and civil society organizations in an array of areas, including transparency, integrity, governance, monitoring, internal controls, social auditing, advocacy, and awareness campaigns.
5. Issues in accountability and transparency in the decision-making process in relation to REDD+.
6. Limited involvement of the community in governance, institutions, and policies, such as logging, mining, etc.
7. Inadequate legal frameworks for providing an enabling environment for REDD+-associated institutions and sectors.
8. The absence of a land-use policy.
9. A limited policy on indigenous rights.
10. Insufficient awareness of the negative impact of commercial mining operations.
11. Gaps in law enforcement, which jeopardize the ability of legislators to implement legal, economic, administrative, social, and technical measures related to the conservation and utilisation of forests.

\(^{25}\) Suriname Private Sector Assessment Report 2014.
4. **ACTOR-SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR PROMOTING INTEGRITY AND MITIGATING CORRUPTION RISK**

The government of Suriname has been slow to establish legislative and administrative measures to control corruption risk. Proposals to tackle such risk, whether in relation to institutional reform, preventive and corrective measures, or government agencies, are limited.

The CRA discovered few social accountability tools such as public hearings, public and social audits, public expenditure tracking, citizen report cards, community scorecards, and the right to information including Ministry of Regional Development's work with Hoorzittingen and Burger Informatie Centra (Citizen Information Centra's) as positive examples. Limited initiatives have been taken to improve governance and ensure transparency and accountability.

**The Role of CSOs in Combating Corruption**

Combating corruption is not a task for the government alone. Indeed, civil society can be a catalyst for mobilizing pressure for reform in Suriname. CSOs must be thoroughly involved in anti-corruption awareness building, monitoring, and reporting on government standards. To ensure the effective use of public resources, civil society must play a key role in setting priorities, monitoring resource management, influencing government directives and policies, and demanding accountability and transparency to mitigate corruption risks.

Most development partners recognize the media and civil society as important stakeholders for strengthening accountability and transparency in Suriname. They can help reshape attitudes and reverse public apathy and tolerance for corruption. They are also useful in advocacy, awareness, capacity development, and research.

Suriname’s civil society and media are not as strong and active as they need to be to combat corruption risk in the country. Public access to information is low. The general public do not have the legal right to obtain information, and the government has not yet developed proactive disclosure policies.

There is no denying that government agencies, irrespective of their nature and size, are all exposed to corruption risks. These risks can create many complications, including the destruction of the agency itself. Therefore, it is important that agencies be aware of such risks and work to mitigate them as soon as possible. However, while some issues can be resolved in the short term, some risks originate at the political and policy levels and require longer-term solutions.

The findings of the assessment suggest focusing on the following strategic areas to build on the strengths of the government’s current anti-corruption initiatives. These recommendations include activities that can be implemented immediately, as well as in the medium and long term.
Medium- and Long-Term Action Areas

1. Parliament can engage in developing a legal framework and strengthening integrity standards for elected and appointed officials at the national and local levels. Also, it can finalize and ratify legislation on anti-corruption and the governance of all sectors.

2. The government should seek to create a legal framework and build its capacity in dealing with conflicts of interest, controlling the property and income of public officials, enhancing the role of internal control and complaint bodies at ministries and public institutions, ensuring transparency in public procurement, and streamlining free access to information.

3. The Ministry of Natural Resources can mitigate corruption risks by introducing a single-window system for issuing permits, licenses, concessions, etc. It can also provide mechanisms for promoting integrity, accountability, and transparency in the making and implementation of decisions, such as adopting a transparent information system on mining, energy, water, etc.

4. The Ministry of Finance can encourage transparency in reporting government revenue and expenditures.

5. Corruption risks in the environmental sector can be addressed by launching a campaign to raise public awareness of the ecosystem damage and personal costs associated with resource extraction, advocating for greater transparency in decisions on resource use and distribution, and increasing the capacity for community involvement in environmental management.

6. The Ministry of Physical Planning, Land, and Forest Management can institute a transparent policy for issuing permits for logging, agriculture, mining, and infrastructure development based on land tenure and property rights. Moreover, it can improve its administrative structures and the entire law enforcement chain.

7. The Ministry of Justice can amend the laws related to sectors like water, energy, mining, and forestry; establish procedures and mechanisms to detect and prosecute corruption related to the environment; adopt a framework and build capacities for horizontal and vertical cooperation and information exchange among the police, prosecutors’ offices, the judiciary, other public authorities and institutions, and regulatory and supervisory bodies; educate court staff; and institute an ombudsman, an anti-corruption help desk, and an anti-corruption agency.

8. The Ministry of Regional Development can implement efficient systems and mechanisms for the inspection, control, decentralization, and balancing of authority for regional development, community participation, and local governance.

9. A national anti-corruption law/institution can strengthen the investigative capacity of anti-corruption agencies and the Prosecutor Council on environment/mining/forest-related cases to deter potential wrongdoers.

10. The Supreme Audit Institution can align its legal framework and capacities to operate according to the standards of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) and improve its ability to perform forensic accounting, money laundering, and lifestyle audits.

11. The Central Bank can play a vital role by developing its ability to more effectively identify, trace, and suppress money laundering and the financing of terrorism; prevent the informal economy; and
enhance its financial investigations, especially in the mining and forestry sectors, by promoting stolen asset recovery initiatives and strengthening international cooperation.

**Short-Term Action Areas**

12. NIMOS/REDD+ can address corruption risks in many areas. In the short term, it can build capacity, strengthen REDD+ strategy, help raise awareness, and assist civil society organizations to promote REDD+ integrity. It can also improve the rights of indigenous and interior communities, data sharing, and local governance. In the medium and long term, it can support legislation reforms such as land rights, grievance redress, etc.  

13. Civil society organizations can significantly influence corruption risk mitigation by demanding increased freedom of expression, supporting integrity and transparency, encouraging accountability, changing the corruption-tolerant culture, pressuring the government to comply with anti-corruption conventions, promoting the active participation of society in anti-corruption activities, raising awareness, strengthening the role of civil society organizations in monitoring the public sector, etc.

14. The media can call for freedom of expression, of information, and of the press; publicize the principles of integrity, transparency, and anti-corruption to the masses; and launch awareness campaigns through scientific articles on corruption and its causes, indicators, and effects, as well as on anti-corruption mechanisms.

### 4.1 Analysis of Opportunities

- Strong public opinion exists on good governance, the rule of law, transparency, malpractice, concessions, permits, mining, and illegal logging.
- National and international actors, technical experts, and studies all consider corruption to be the main cause of illegal mining and deforestation.
- The membership of Suriname in the Convention against Corruption is expected to activate bilateral and multilateral anti-corruption mechanisms.

### 4.2 Analysis of Gaps and Deficiencies

There is a long list of laws, institutions, mechanisms, and procedures that do not exist, need significant strengthening, or require meaningful implementation at each key actor level. The following are actor-focused programmatic recommendations:

1. The institutionalization of internal control systems.
3. A mechanism to oversee the strategy.
4. Enhanced corruption prevention and investigation skills.

Good governance is required for Suriname’s structural transformation. Beyond mitigating corruption risks, the transformation agenda involves building credible legislation, structures, and mechanisms and making information on the activities of the public administration available to citizens.

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26 The detailed action plan has been provided in Section 4.6.
5. Enforced sanctions.
6. Increased awareness and education, which will reduce the opportunities for corruption.
7. The institutionalization of specific prevention methods.

4.3 Analytical Framework for Anti-Corruption Interventions

The broad nature of corruption demands a clearly delineated multidimensional and multi-stakeholder strategic vision that promotes anti-corruption measures. An analytical framework based on national realities and international best practices can be a useful tool in this process. The framework to design a comprehensive actor-focused mitigation strategy for UNDP/Suriname consists of three key dimensions:

1. Integrity programs across sectors.
2. Technical interventions.
3. Multi-actor participation.

1. Integrity programs: These involve strengthening and reforming structures and mechanisms across all programs and sectors, especially mining and forestry, so that they are transparent, accountable, ethical, and professional. Other sectors include justice, law enforcement, the Supreme Audit Institution, the Central Bank, etc. Other cross-cutting areas are likely to benefit, such as public procurement, public expenditure management, civil service reform, and internal audit and control practices.

2. Technical interventions: Conventional schools of thought suggest that law enforcement agencies are authorized to detect potential abuses, investigate and prosecute them, and impose judicial or legal decisions against malpractices. Modern schools, by contrast, hold that law enforcement by itself is not sufficient to maintain integrity, and that to do this requires political will. Preventive actions and reforms, public awareness, and education programs are hence essential to ensure high civic standards.

3. Multi-actor participation: The most sustainable corruption risk mitigation and integrity measures include strong and committed participation by all stakeholders—the government, civil society, the private sector, and the media. Success depends on using each actor’s strengths, motivations, institutional capacities, resources, and constituencies. This mechanism yields a healthy partnership that will keep integrity sustainable.

4. Engagement strategy: The engagement strategy aims to: a) ensure political will and promote ethical leadership and integrity, b) strengthen systems to prevent and combat corruption, c) promote cooperation for a collective anti-corruption alliance, and d) educate the public and raise awareness.

4.4 Corruption Risk Mitigation and Integrity Promotion Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of Good Governance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equity and inclusiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness and efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

From experience, we can learn which corruption mitigation and integrity promotion measures work and which do not—and why. Their effectiveness is always influenced by a country’s historical, social, economic, institutional, and political circumstances. In the context of Suriname, corruption risk mitigation measures must suit the socio-political and economic environment to win the support of a critical mass of key stakeholders.

4.5 Entry Points

Based on the assessment findings, two entry points have been identified. The first is vertical accountability, under which non-state actors hold the government responsible through the relationship between citizens and their political representatives. This includes the downward accountability of political leaders to their constituents and their downward societal accountability to the media and the public, which monitor the actions of the state. The second entry point is horizontal accountability, an intra-governmental control mechanism among the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary and among different sub-entities of the executive, including the cabinet, line ministries, and administrative departments and agencies. In addition to administering the courts and parliamentary oversight, this includes special organizations such as the Supreme Audit Institution, the human rights commission, and an ombudsman (still not in place). This system ensures the accountability of public employees to the political leadership.

Based on the above framework and entry points, the following measures are proposed for corruption risk management in Suriname.

Corruption thrives when the government is not sufficiently accountable to its citizens or to the law. When independent oversight from parliament is not effective, politics are put above ethics and a lack of transparency results. While some laws and regulations exist on paper in Suriname that provide a framework for good governance, few control mechanisms operate in reality to ensure that this framework functions honestly, transparently, and in accordance with the public good. These dynamics are at work at both the elite and administrative levels.

Reducing corruption is ultimately a matter of political will. It will require a comprehensive approach that prioritizes transparency and citizen oversight of the government. This can be facilitated by building the capacity of civil society, in addition to public institutions, to educate citizens, advocate for reform, and monitor the government to encourage the responsible and accountable use of public resources.

Because of the relative institutional weakness of civil society and the inability of ordinary citizens to hold their government accountable, the risk of corruption exists in every nook and corner of Suriname. In this regard, the CRA has identified various actors that are vital in mitigating corruption risk.

The following table summarizes time-bound intervention strategies for each key actor.

Table 6: Interventions According to Actor and Time Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Immediate and Short Term</th>
<th>Medium Term</th>
<th>Long Term</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Political will</th>
<th>Legislation reforms</th>
<th>New legislation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public institutions</td>
<td>Transparency, rule of law, and integrity</td>
<td>Strengthening</td>
<td>Structures, mechanisms, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitutional bodies (e.g., Supreme Audit Institution, prosecutor, etc.)</td>
<td>Capacity building in specialised areas</td>
<td>Legislation, procedures, and mechanisms</td>
<td>New laws, procedures, and mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMOS/REDD+</td>
<td>Awareness, capacity building, and communication in areas like violation of rights, conflicts over land, land grabbing, and deforestation</td>
<td>Strengthening mechanisms and elimination of regulatory loopholes, inconsistencies, discretionary decision making, etc.</td>
<td>Policies, procedures, regulations, coordination mechanisms, reforms for transparency and accountability, data to support decisions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td>Awareness and capacity building, educational needs assessment, etc.</td>
<td>Integrity reforms in corporate laws, curriculum development</td>
<td>New corporate laws, integrity reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Awareness, information, code of conduct, responsibility</td>
<td>Corporate governance reforms, corporate and social responsibility</td>
<td>New legislation, mechanisms, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media</td>
<td>Awareness and capacity building on access to information</td>
<td>Access to information</td>
<td>Mechanisms, structures, strengthening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Integrity and CR-related support</td>
<td>Mechanisms, structures, etc. for CR management</td>
<td>Strengthening, structures, reforms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6 Specific Recommendations for NIMOS/REDD+

Corruption impedes the positive development REDD+ seeks to achieve in Suriname, as well as sideling forest-dependent communities. Several themes have emerged from the CRA that target major cross-sectoral pathways to overcoming this endemic problem. Based on the CRA findings, addressing corruption requires collaboration among the government, CSOs, and the donor. The following recommendations could contribute to the optimal implementation of REDD+ in Suriname and the strengthening of forestry governance.

It is vital to provide assistance to prevent and suppress corruption throughout the country, including at the national and sub-national levels, during the REDD+ implementation phase, not only because it is crucial for the initiative’s success, but also to strengthen the good governance architecture in Suriname.

Based on the CRA findings, the study of laws and agencies, and interviews with key informants, the following recommendations are suggested to help NIMOS/REDD+ target possible entry points for action to deal with corruption risks in the short term. Such actions can be selected based on financial and human resources.
The following are *immediate (short-term) and medium-term* focussed actions that will help in corruption risk mitigation while selection can be made according to appropriateness:

**Governance**
1. Launch an awareness-raising campaign at the national level to institute a code of conduct for public officials.
2. Initiate a better dialogue among key oversight institutions to finalize anti-corruption laws.
3. Explore possible cooperation to identify corruption risk-prone locations.
4. Develop relationships with change agents, such as CSOs/NGOs, anti-corruption champions, the private sector, and professional associations, and seek opportunities to collectively scale up anti-corruption initiatives.
5. Support citizen-centered advocacy by educating the public to abandon values that encourage corrupt practices and embrace transparency, accountability, and the right to information.
6. Develop and encourage citizen-led anti-corruption groups, networks, and coalitions from grassroots to mainstream at all political levels.
7. Organize and coordinate an anti-corruption campaign with the media and with educational and religious organisations.
8. Advocate for strong regulations and criminal penalties for money laundering.
9. Create and implement “sensitisation programmes” for law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, politicians, and the public on the role of journalists in fighting for anti-corruption measures.
10. Increase capacity at different levels of government, with particular attention to forestry and REDD+.
11. Promote transparency, accountability, and capacity-building programs to reinforce the role of public oversight organizations such as the Supreme Audit Institution and parliamentary committees.
12. Provide environmental education and awareness campaigns about rights and responsibilities to help the local population.
13. Simplify the anti-corruption laws and regulations (through paraphrasing) and distribute this version through public forums.
14. Facilitate the publication of an annual anti-corruption book by an independent and credible CSO.
15. Build the capacity of judicial institutions, such as the prosecutor’s office, to fight against impunity and to establish protection schemes that encourage whistleblowing.

**NIMOS/REDD+**
1. Map corruption hot spots in REDD+ areas and the forestry sector.
2. Build the capacity of REDD+ practitioners.
3. Increase the understanding of REDD+ and related corruption risks among national and local institutions (including local and indigenous communities and civil society organizations).
4. Develop the awareness and ability to reduce the potential for forest-related corruption at the local level by:
   - Clarifying resource ownership and carbon rights.
   - Recognizing corrupt practices as wrong.
   - Providing easy access to information on local projects, planning processes, and promised benefits.
- Educating the interior community on relevant forestry laws and rights.
- Instituting accountability mechanisms, such as systematic audits and independent monitoring and compliance protocols.
- Encouraging transparency in local decision making, budgeting, expenditures, and contracting practices.

5. Assist local governance systems to counter the risks of REDD+ corruption.
6. Improve checks and procedures against money laundering in relation to REDD+.
7. Offer educational programs on governance and corruption risks in forestry and REDD+ that target university students, local communities, CSOs/NGOs, and officials.
8. Sponsor the production of teaching and information materials on REDD+ and forest governance, including anti-corruption issues.
9. Raise awareness of REDD+ as a foundation of integrity.
10. Develop the ability of CSOs to oversee REDD+ anti-corruption efforts.
11. Strengthen the institutional capacity for reward and punishment.
12. Help expedite environment-related prosecution cases.
13. To ensure integrity in public workplaces, initiate the institutionalization of anti-corruption measures, such as corruption prevention plans and risk assessments.
14. Introduce anti-corruption curricula in educational and training institutions.
15. Facilitate CSOs in fighting corruption and encourage the private sector to take disciplinary action against citizens who indulge in corrupt practices and financial irregularities.
16. Assist governance institutions to tackle risks at the local level, as identified during the REDD+ design phase, to detect, prevent, and suppress corruption in REDD+ implementation.
17. Identify 1) REDD+-specific corruption risks at the national and sub-national levels, 2) the local governance institutions (including indigenous communities and civil society) best suited to dealing with corruption, and 3) feasible anti-corruption measures.
18. Enhance support for the engagement of local and indigenous (interior) communities and civil society institutions in monitoring REDD+ decision making and activities, for example by creating oversight committees.
19. Advocate for greater transparency in decisions on resource use and distribution, as well as on forest management and REDD+ policies.
20. Execute massive information, education, and communication campaigns on REDD+ at all levels, with a particular emphasis on governance and operations.
21. Design REDD+-specific anti-corruption measures, clarify the role of local governance institutions, and introduce these proposals in REDD+ programs.
22. Improve the capacity of civil society organizations and local governance institutions to manage investigations, collaborate with national entities, monitor the REDD+ complaints systems, and ensure whistleblower protection.
23. Endorse the establishment or amelioration of a grievance mechanism.
24. Strengthen policies, regulatory frameworks, stakeholder capacities, and governance related to the sustainable management of natural resources at the national and sub-national levels to guarantee the rights of local and indigenous communities.
25. Define the best ways to enhance forest and REDD+ governance structures and practices in Suriname, especially to protect the rights and access of indigenous peoples and local communities.
26. Help civil society play a more constructive role in REDD+.
27. Train investigative journalists on specific areas of REDD+.

The Media

1. Campaign to legislate the liberalisation of broadcasting and greater access to information from public institutions.
2. Train media personnel on investigative reporting and analysis.
3. Advocate for the balanced coverage of corruption issues in the private and public sectors.
4. Engage the media in a public awareness campaign on corruption risks.

Long-Term Strategies

1. Help strengthen national-level monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-corruption and oversight-related laws.
2. Explore possible cooperation with development partners for technical support to improve asset recovery and anti-money laundering efforts.
3. Facilitate the amelioration of existing government initiatives in revenue generation, asset declaration, public procurement, e-bidding, etc.
4. Funding an independent and credible organization to conduct an annual anti-corruption perception investigation to set a national benchmark.
5. Encourage CSOs to promote a “zero tolerance” policy for corruption among the public.
6. Support the automation of the oversight agencies to scale up transparency and accountability.
7. Create a monitoring mechanism for public expenditure and update it annually to guarantee that the government, CSOs, and development partners are using funds accountably.
8. Assist civil society, the media, and investigative journalists to enhance constructive civic engagement in curbing corruption.

4.7 Overview of Civil Society Organizations and Their Capacity for Advocacy on Corruption Risk Mitigation Measures

Suriname’s civil society includes many stakeholders. Private-sector organizations and labour unions are relatively established, and NGOs focus on various areas. Among the numerous NGOs are development organizations, human rights and indigenous groups, women’s associations, religious and church-affiliated societies, sports clubs, community service and community-based organizations (CBOs), and academic institutions.

Civic participation is particularly important for corruption risk mitigation and integrity promotion. Civil society organizations can be of vital assistance in this area. Hence, in the CRA process, the study informally examined the capacity of CSOs (though the number visited was few) in various areas, such as advocacy and organization, organizational development, information sharing and communication management, accessing funding, stakeholder relations, and legal and regulatory frameworks.
Although brief, the assessment calls for a comprehensive approach to capacity development within the CSOs in Suriname and suggests building upon their existing abilities and strengths. To create maximum value and sustainability, development initiatives should be undertaken to improve integrity promotion and corruption risk mitigation measures.

The assessment had two main purposes. Firstly, it aimed to draft recommendations that could inform future demand-driven interventions to advance the capacities of CSOs. Secondly, it sought to determine a baseline representing their organizational and advocacy abilities.

To help build these organizational and advocacy capacities, it is possible to use a combination of interactive workshops, seminars, follow-up mentoring, experience exchanges, and learning circles tailored to the needs of individual CSOs. These should emphasize critical thinking skills in the context of developing organizational and advocacy strategies on integrity promotion and corruption risk mitigation.

The next capacity development plan for relevant and interested civil society groups is the final step in achieving the objective of this study: to create a feasible, action-oriented strategy to address the capacity challenges defined by the CRA assessment.

**The Role of UNDP Suriname**

Corruption risk management in REDD+ requires an integrated and multi-level approach. Although many corruption threats exist at various levels, they cannot be tackled in isolation from the larger multi-level governance system through which REDD+ is to be implemented. Addressing challenges nationally and locally will require national, sectoral, and sub-national capacity development. UNDP Suriname’s support is important to its partners at the national level through its technical advisory assistance. It can help ensure that REDD+ is effectively integrated into the national development strategy and that civil society is able to advocate for local interests in national planning around REDD+ in Suriname.
5. CONCLUSIONS

Unequivocally, dishonesty and corruption are major barriers to development. They are also the greatest corruption threat to Suriname. In spite of this, there is hope that corruption can be wiped out through honest efforts by all stakeholders, including civil society, the media, religious groups, academia, students, and public institutions.

The range of corruption risk mitigation measures this study proposes provides a broad and rich programmatic scope for sustainable integrity promotion in Suriname. Each approach is further divided into subtypes, which more specifically target the program’s focus and can be expanded during action plan development. These measures will position Suriname to embrace transparency, the rule of law, and good governance; boost the sluggish economy; and achieve a more stable, prosperous, and democratic country.
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UN / UNDP RESOURCES

1. Source Book on Accountability, Transparency and Integrity (Module 10: Resources on ATI provides a full list of references, web links and sources of information.) http://intra.undp.org/bdp/anti-corruption/sourcebook_ati.htm
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16. UNESCO www.unesco.org/iiep/eng

World Bank

International Monetary Fund

USAID
OECD
   http://www1.oecd.org/puma/ethics/index.htm

Society Organisations, Academe, Media and other information sources
    Hands pages www.beta.co.yu/korupcija/eng  Center for International Private Enterprise
    www.cipe.org/programs/corruption  Colgate University, Corruption Bibliography
    http://people/colgate.edu/mjohnston  Committee to Protect Journalists www.cpj.org  Ethics Resource
    Center  www.ethics.org  Freedom of Information Laws  http://home.online.no/~wkeim/foil.htm
    Project (Center for Public Integrity)  http://www.publicintegrity.org  Global Witness (Publish What
    you Pay Initiative", jointly with Transparency International, Global Compact)
    www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/oil/publish_what_pay.html  Human Rights Trust of Southern
    Africa www.sahrit.org

Paris Declaration
22. www.parisdeclaration.org Philippine Center for Investigative Journalismwww.pciij.org

Boxes
Box 1: Principles of Good Governance

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Table 2: Corruption Risks based on Time
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#### UN organizations/International organizations

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<th>Institution/Organization/Ministry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNDP Deputy Resident Representative</td>
<td>Mr. A. Alexis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNDP Programme Staff (Governance and Energy &amp; Environment)</td>
<td>Ms. A. Khoenkhoen, Ms. M. Hubard &amp; Mr. B. Drakenstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNICEF M&amp;E officer</td>
<td>Ms. P. Hirasingh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDB (Representative &amp; Chief of Operations)</td>
<td>Mr. C. Falconi &amp; Ms. L.A. Edwards</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>US Embassy (Chief Political Economic Affairs &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. B. Marcus &amp; Ms. B. Chandoe</td>
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#### Parliament

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>REDD+ PMU (Project Coordinator, Technical Assistant and M&amp;E officer)</td>
<td>Mr. A. Pershad, Ms. S. Mahabier &amp; Ms. T. Lieuw</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Institute for Environment and Development in Suriname - NIMOS (Director)</td>
<td>Mr. C. Nelom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Suriname Police Force, Fraud department</td>
<td>Inspector E. Nibte &amp; Inspector P. Moesnadi</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Foundation for Forest Management and Production Control (Research and Development department)</td>
<td>Mr. R. Somopawiro, Ms. S. Crabbe, Ms. S. Svensson &amp; Ms. P. Miranda</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Association of Saramaka Village Leaders (VSG)/REDD+ Assistant</td>
<td>Village Captain N. Petrusi</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ministry of Regional Development (Permanent Secretary &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. W. Finisie, Ms. M. Linga &amp; Mw. A. Seedo</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Police (Permanent Secretary &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. H. Tjin Liep Shie, Mr. Bhagwandas &amp; Ms. D. Santokhi</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Central Government Accounting Services (Director and</td>
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<td>Mr. I. Sno &amp; Ms. E. Groenfelt</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>M. I. Wekker</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Central Bank of Suriname (Governor &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. G. Gersie, Ms. R. Frankel and Mr. W. Orie</td>
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<td>Ministry of Justice and Police, Bureau International Affairs (Head)</td>
<td>Ms. B. Cederboom</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Ministry of Spatial Planning, Land and Forest Management (Deputy Permanent Secretary &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. D. Saeroon, Ms. K. Tajib, Ms. C. Sakimin, Mr. H. Esajas, Mr. R. Ho-Tsoi and Ms. P. Podrono</td>
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**Civil Society**

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<td>1</td>
<td>Projekta foundation (Director &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Ms. S. Ganga, Ms. R. Bhattacharji &amp; Mr. M. Sonneveld</td>
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**Private Sector**

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<td>1</td>
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<td>Mr. A. Padarath</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Suriname Trade and Industry Association – VSB (Director)</td>
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**Others**

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<tr>
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<td>Supreme Audit Institution (President &amp; Head International Affairs)</td>
<td>Ms. C. Felter &amp; Ms. G. de Mees</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>University of Suriname, Institute Graduate Studies and Research (Director)</td>
<td>Mr. D. Lachman</td>
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<td>Public Prosecutor Office (Attorney General)</td>
<td>Mr. R. Baidjnath Panday</td>
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<td>Mr. I. Jammaludin</td>
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<td>Economist Association in Suriname (Chair &amp; member)</td>
<td>Mr. W. Ramautarsingh &amp; Mr. S. Debipersad</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Civil Service (individual)</td>
<td>Mr. Raoul Dankoor</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Business (individual)</td>
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<td>Mr. F. Tawjoeram &amp; Ms. S. Khedoe</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Institution/Organization/Ministry</td>
<td>Resource person(s)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Central Government Accounting Services (Director and Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. R. Resida, Mw. H. Commissie &amp; Ms. H. Simons</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources (Permanent Secretary)</td>
<td>Mr. D. Abeleven</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>General Bureau of Statistics (Director &amp; Census Manager)</td>
<td>Mr. I. Sno &amp; Ms. E. Groenfelt</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Customs Office (Head)</td>
<td>M. I. Wekker</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Central Bank of Suriname (Governor &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Mr. G. Gersie, Ms. R. Frankel and Mr. W. Orie</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Police, Bureau International Affairs (Head)</td>
<td>Ms. B. Cederboom</td>
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<td>Ministry of Spatial Planning, Land and Forest Management (Deputy Permanent Secretary)</td>
<td>Mr. D. Saeroon</td>
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<td>Civil Society</td>
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<td>1  Projekta foundation (Director &amp; Staff)</td>
<td>Ms. S. Ganga, Ms. R. Bhattacharji &amp; Mr. M. Sonneveld</td>
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<td>Private Sector</td>
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<td>1  Chamber of Commerce (Chair of the Board)</td>
<td>Mr. A. Padarath</td>
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<td>2  Suriname Trade and Industry Association – VSB (Director)</td>
<td>Mr. S. Mac Andrew</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>No  Institution/Organization/Ministry</td>
<td>Resource person(s)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1  Supreme Audit Institution (President &amp; Head International Affairs)</td>
<td>Ms. C. Felter &amp; Ms. G. de Mees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2  University of Suriname, Institute Graduate Studies and Research (Director)</td>
<td>Mr. D. Lachman</td>
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<td>3  Public Prosecutor Office (Attorney General)</td>
<td>Mr. R. Baidjnath Panday</td>
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<td>4  IRIS - Inter-Religious Board Suriname (Chair)</td>
<td>Mr. I. Jammaludin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5  Economist Association in Suriname (Chair &amp; member)</td>
<td>Mr. W. Ramautarsingh &amp; Mr. S. Debipersad</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6  Civil Service (individual)</td>
<td>Mr. Raoul Dankoor</td>
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Appendix 2: List of Documents Reviewed

1. Stakeholder meeting notes
2. Background documentation:
   - National regulatory framework for public procurement with focus on integrity related issues and conflicting
   - Anti-corruption legislation (draft) 2015.
   - International regulatory framework, in particular the UNCAC and national regulatory framework in particular the Account Act (comptabiltiteits wet), Law on principles of State land policy (L-decreet 1982),
   - Mining law (Mijnbouw wet 1986),
   - Law on Forest Management (Wet Bosbeheer 1992),
   - Law on Mineral Exploration and Extraction Near Water Sources, Protected Areas and Forests
3. The National REDD+ Readiness
5. Forest Management Act
6. Criminal Code (Government Gazette 1911 no. 1, as lastly amended by Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006 no. 42 with regard to the revision of the First Book of the Criminal Code
7. LAW of December 2, 1952, regulating the administration and accountability of funds in Suriname (G.B. 1952 no. 111)
8. Decree of 8 May 1986 containing general rules concerning the exploration and exploitation of minerals (Mining Decree)
Appendix 3: Terms of Reference

CONSULTANT PROCUREMENT NOTICE

Date: 16 August 2016

Contracting Unit: UNDP Suriname

Description of the assignment: International Consultant Corruption Risk Assessment for Suriname

Division/Department: Governance – UNDP Suriname

Period of assignment/services (if applicable): Sixty (60) working days with the possibility of extension to 80 working days

Location: Paramaribo, Suriname

Expected Start Date: September 2016

The applicant is requested to submit a financial proposal (quotation) accompanied by a resume (CV) and P11 history form to the following email address procurement.sr@undp.org no later than 31 August 2016 with the assignment name as subject.

Please indicate clearly your availability during period mentioned above

Any request for clarification must be sent in writing, or by standard electronic communication to the email address indicated above. UNDP Suriname will respond in writing or by standard electronic mail and will send written copies of the response, including an explanation of the query without identifying the source of inquiry, to all consultants.
Terms of Reference

Corruption Risk Assessment for Suriname

**Position:** International Consultant Corruption Risk Assessment for Suriname
**Duration:** Sixty (60) working days with the possibility of extension to 80 working days
**Period:** September 2016 – November 2016
**Focal point:** Programme Analyst Governance – UNDP Suriname

**Status:** Part Time

Background

Suriname has signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC), but the country has not ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention (UNCAC). The Ministry of Justice and Police is responsible for combating and coordinating activities on corruption. The Bureau for Fraud within the National Police is in charge of investigating corruption cases such as fraud and economic crime. To date Suriname does not have special anti-corruption legislation in place, but the Penal Code does refer to anti-corruption and criminalizes corrupt activities. The Ministry of Justice and Police has drafted an anti-corruption Bill which has been on the National Assembly’s agenda for discussion for some years now.

The anti-corruption measures in the Penal Code are being enforced, with the bulk of those prosecuted for corruption to date being civil servants. There is a perception that corruption is most pervasive in the areas of government procurement (especially public works), land policy, bribery for services and taxation. The police face constraints that are mostly the result of lack of investigative skills especially in detecting sophisticated white collar crime and an understanding of the methods, processes and modalities of applying anti-corruption initiatives.

Problems of corruption in mining, agriculture and forestry are very common and have been important in influencing reforms and regulation in these sectors. In recent years the Government has voiced interest in implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Suriname. There is recognition of the importance of transparency regarding natural resource management with special attention for the balance between sustainable development and economic growth.

This assignment is intentionally broad in scope, looking at issues of transparency and corruption and making recommendations which can then feed into a follow-up study looking specifically at corruption within the context of REDD+ in Suriname.
Objective
The primary objective of this assignment is to perform a comprehensive corruption risk assessment and to make recommendations on measures for integrity/corruption risks mitigation.

These recommendations will be tailored, in a following exercise, to the specific context of REDD+\(^1\) in Suriname.

Strategy
The assignment will include two missions. The first mission (tentatively scheduled to take place in the period August 2016) will entail the review of relevant background documents, national legislation, materials, and reports, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews involving officials from all Ministries, but more specifically, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and Police, the Supreme Audit Institution in Suriname and other relevant institutions, in order to identify the institutional context and specific gaps for effective anti-corruption measures. It may also include interviews and/or focus group discussions with key external partners and civil society organizations.

The second mission, which will be undertaken at least one month after the first mission, will involve the presentation of the draft assessment report of corruption risks. The final assessment report will be submitted to the UNDP after the second mission.

The international consultant will work in collaboration with a national consultant. The Country Office will support in drafting the ToR for the national consultant and will also present the international consultant with a short list of qualified suitable national consultants to consider, with indicative bandwidth for daily fee of national consultant. The national consultant will function as a resource person.

Scope of work and expected outputs:
This consultancy will have two major outputs:

(1) **A Report entailing a comprehensive corruption risk assessment, whose major section will be time-bound (immediate, medium and long term) and actor-specific recommendations on measures for promoting integrity and mitigating corruption risks**

\(^1\) REDD+ is a forest-based climate change mitigation approach for developing countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
(2) **A capacity development plan for relevant and interested civil society groups and media, with specific and measurable indicators**

All deliverables under this consultancy should be written in English in a concise and user-friendly language.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Indicative dates</th>
<th>Indicative percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Approved inception report and detailed work plan</td>
<td>15 Sept 2016</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approved draft report entailing a comprehensive corruption risk assessment and outline of proposed capacity development plan</td>
<td>18 Oct 2016</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accepted final report entailing a comprehensive corruption risk assessment and capacity development plan</td>
<td>14 Nov 2016</td>
<td>35%</td>
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The Consultant will execute the following specific tasks:

1. Carry out an analysis/expertise of the background documentation, including national regulatory framework for public procurement with focus on integrity related issues and conflicting legislation, compared to the international regulatory framework, in particular the UNCAC and national regulatory framework in particular the Account Act (comptabiliteitwet), Law on principles of State land policy (L-decreet 1982), Mining law (Mijnbouw wet 1986), Law on Forest Management (Wet Bosbeheer 1992), Law on transiting of goods (wet goederenverkeer 2003) and the Regulations regarding Procurement of Works (Aanbestedingsreglement voor Werken - 1996);
2. Evaluate the institutional framework in the field and its operational capacities, efficiency of integrity mechanisms, control and punishment;
3. Identify the stakeholders to be involved in the CRA and who can a) provide support the Institutional Context Analysis. b) provide information to the analysis. Attention should be given to achieving gender balance amongst stakeholders in this process
4. Identify the focus group(s), develop the questionnaires for individual and focus group interviews; organize the focus group sessions and individual interviews with the selected stakeholders to identify problems and risk sectors, evaluate the needs in the field and formulate the recommendations to mitigate corruption risks;
5. Present the draft assessment report with the required inputs/recommendations
6. Submit the final assessment report with required inputs/recommendations
7. Have two working sessions with the person who will take on the second phase of applying the recommendations to the REDD+ context in order to pass on all relevant information
Supervision

The consultant will report to the UNDP Analyst for Governance on day to day issues and progress; the overall study will be overseen by the Deputy Resident Representative.

Core competencies

- Demonstrated understanding of anti-corruption environments including in the Caribbean Region, and in country context similar to Suriname;
- Demonstrates integrity by modelling the UN’s values and ethical standards.

Functional competencies

- Demonstrated ability to undertake high level desk review research, prepare reports and recommendations, analyse complex situations.
- Excellent interview, writing and reporting skills.
- Strong organization skills for meetings, logistics.
- Ability to plan

- Teamwork and skills in coordination

Recruitment Qualifications

- Master’s Degree in Political Science, Journalism, Law, Public Administration, or other relevant Social Sciences;
- Proven record of knowledge and expertise in the field of anti-corruption;
- At least 5 years of proven experience in conducting corruption risk assessments, practical experience in the field will be considered a strong advantage
- Demonstrated analytical skills for producing clearly formulated and well-argued assessment reports or similar work
- Demonstrated experience in working with a variety of stakeholders from all key sectors; public, private and civil society including the religious bodies and the media
- Fluency in spoken and written English.
Appendix 4: Definition of Accountability, Transparency and Integrity

ACCOUNTABILITY means holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible. Accountability stands on three pillars:

1. Financial accountability is the obligation of anyone handling resources, public office or any other position of trust, to report on the intended and actual use of the resources or of the designated office. This includes ensuring transparency in the process and procedures to achieve that obligation.

2. Administrative accountability includes critical systems of control internal to the government, which complements and ensures the proper functioning of checks and balance supplied by the constitutional government and an engaged citizenry. These include civil service standards and incentives, ethics codes, criminal penalties, and administrative review.

3. Political accountability, fundamentally begins with a free and transparent elections, is an effective starting point for oversight. In an electoral democracy, people have a regular, open method for sanctioning or rewarding those who hold positions of public trust. Through periodic elections and control mechanism, elected and appointed officials are held accountable for their actions while holding public office. Another mechanism to achieve more specific oversight is to have the three political branches (executive, legislative and the judiciary) watch over each other. In addition, separating the institution that raises and spends funds from that which actually executes the spending decision helps ensure that the underlying public interest is served.

4. Social accountability, a demand driven approach that relies on civic engagement and involves ordinary citizens and groups exacting greater accountability for public actions and outcomes.

TRANSPARENCY comprises all means of facilitating citizens’ access to information and their understanding of decision-making mechanisms. Public sector transparency begins with the clear application of standards and access to information.

INTEGRITY is a key element that completes the notion of accountability and transparency. It is defined as incorruptibility, an unimpaired condition or soundness, and is synonymous to honesty. In terms of public service, integrity requires that holders of public office should not place themselves under financial and other obligation to outside individuals or organizations that may influence them in the performance of their official duties. Integrity is not an end in itself rather than a path leading to the effective delivery of the services and performance of functions, which the public is entitled to receive from those who govern them.